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I. Introduction
The responsibility to protect appears to be a relatively new
doctrine, its current form established by the Report of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(the ICISS) in December 2001.' However, the doctrine has roots
extending deep into international law traditions.2 The idea of
humanitarian intervention has been documented as early as the
1600s, when Hugo Grotius advocated for action if a ruler inflicted
inhumane treatment upon his subjects.' In modem history,
international conflicts since the 1940s, and especially several
atrocities in the 1990s, led some in the international community to
cry out for a doctrine that would allow member states of the
United Nations (U.N.) to "[act] in defense of our common
humanity."'
Out of these conflicts was born the responsibility-to-protect
doctrine, placing a burden on the international community to take
action when necessary to end human suffering.' In 2000, the
ICISS was established and tasked with addressing the tension
between respecting state sovereignty and the concept of
humanitarian intervention.6 The ICISS published its report entitled
"The Responsibility to Protect" in 2001, in which it introduced the
I Int'l Comm'n on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to
Protect (2001), available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20
Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS Report].
2 See Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging
Legal Norm?, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 111 (2007).
3 HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE, 247-48 (A.C. Campbell trans.,
Batoche Books 2001) (1625). See Stahn, supra note 2 at 111.
4 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at § 1.6.
5 Id. at XII.
6 See Jamie Herron, Responsibility to Protect: Moral Triumph or Gateway to
Allowing Powerful States to Invade Weaker States in Violation of The U.N. Charter?, 26
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 367, 372 (2012).
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responsibility to protect doctrine, reframing humanitarian
intervention as furnishing a human right of protection, rather than
a right of states to intervene.! The responsibility to protect rests on
principles of prevention and peacefulness, and requires that all
peaceful means of human protection be exhausted before military
intervention is considered.' Only the most massive human rights
violations, such as genocide, justify military intervention.' By
focusing on prevention and means of least intrusion, the doctrine
aims to balance the protection of human rights with the
sovereignty of each state.'o The responsibility to protect does not
diminish the responsibility of each state to its own citizens, but
imports a responsibility to protect into the concept of state
sovereignty; the doctrine is only triggered when a state cannot or
will not act to protect its citizens."
This comment will focus on the military intervention aspect of
the responsibility-to-protect, and expose the flaws of the doctrine
discoverable only through an examination of specific instances of
intervention and inaction. Upon examination, it becomes evident
that the decision whether or not to intervene and the way in which
intervention itself is carried out do not truly turn on humanitarian
concerns, but rather are guided by strategic and economic
interests. While the doctrine does not preclude weighing of
strategic and economic interests,12 it does require that the primary
purpose of intervention be to end human suffering.13 Although the
use of falsified human rights violations to justify intervention is
cause for concern, the recent inaction and inconsistency of states
in the face of clear and massive human rights violations are more
revealing.
Part I will provide a brief history of the international conflicts
and humanitarian interventions that led to the founding of the
7 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 2.29.
8 Id. at XII.
9 Id.
10 See id. §§ 1.32-.36.
11 Id. at XI.
12 In fact, the doctrine likely requires consideration of these factors: "There must be
a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the
intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the
consequences of inaction." ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII. A thorough analysis of
the likelihood of success will include economic and strategic considerations.
'3 Id.
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ICISS and the establishment of the responsibility to protect
doctrine.14  Part II will explain the modem conception of
humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect,
specifically describing the process by which the international
community may take action under the responsibility to protect
doctrine.'" Part III will identify specific instances in which
responsibility-to-protect intervention strayed from the ideals set
out in the ICISS report, and will use these case studies to examine
the international community's inconsistency in taking action under
the responsibility to protect and identify ulterior motivations
underlying state action and inaction." Part IV will explore the
sociological and legal implications of military interventions that
abuse the doctrine and misapply responsibility-to-protect
principles."
II. Development of the Responsibility-to-Protect
While humanitarian intervention is not a novel concept, the
recent promulgation and apparent acceptance of the responsibility
to protect doctrine into modem international law mark a
significant change in the foundational principles of international
law.'" Humanitarian intervention has gained some support in the
past, but prior to the report by the ICISS it was (and to an extent
still is) viewed by many as a violation of state sovereignty and the
United Nations Charter.
A. The Legal Climate Post- World War II and the Creation of
the United Nations
Even before the United Nations Charter went into effect in
1945,'9 and as demonstrated by the Nuremberg Trials, the
international community understood intrastate conflicts not to be
14 See infra pp. 168-72.
15 See infra pp. 172-84.
16 See infra pp. 184-200.
17 See infra pp. 200-208.
18 The United Nations incorporated the responsibility to protect in Resolution 60/1,
2005 World Summit Outcome, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
2005. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res 60/1, TI 138-39, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1
(Oct. 24, 2005).
19 History of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONs, https://www.un.org/en/aboutun
/history/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
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matters of international concern.2 Though the human rights
violations and genocide committed by the Nazi party began before
the commencement of World War II, the charges brought against
the Nazis in the Nuremberg Trials were limited to actions that took
place during the war, once the matter had become an international
conflict.21 When the U.N. Charter became effective in 1945, it
gave sound legal effect to the understanding that intrastate
conflicts were not of international concern: Article 2 of the U.N.
Charter provides that "[a]ll members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
"22 "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter .... 23
The only exception to the prohibition on the use of force
against another state is Article 51, which addresses the right to
self-defense against an armed attack.24
B. Creation and Evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded
in 1949 as an alliance established primarily for military purposes.2 5
In the 1950s, NATO was considered a defensive organization;
upon its founding, the treaty provided that should one of the
member states suffer an attack, all member states would respond.2 6
NATO's strategic doctrine of the 1950s was "massive retaliation,"
a doctrine that reflected the fear and tension of the period.2 7 In
20 See Leila Nadya Sadat, Redefining Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW ENG. L. Rev.
241, 245 (2001).
21 Id.
22 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
23 Id. at art. 2, para. 7.
24 Id. at art. 51.
25 A Short History of NA TO, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION,
http://www.nato.int/history/nato-history.htmI (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
26 Id.
27 See id.
2014 175
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
short, the massive retaliation doctrine provided that should the
Soviet Union attack, NATO would retaliate with nuclear
weapons.28 As tensions began to cool in the 1960s, NATO began
to evolve, and by 1967 NATO was moving toward a model that
encouraged dialogue between international adversaries.2 9 By the
time the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, new international
conflicts had arisen.30 NATO's participation in several pre-
responsibility-to-protect humanitarian interventions in the 1990s,
beginning with its aid to the U.N. in ending the Yugoslav conflict,
solidified its role in the international community as a "tool for []
stabilization. ,3 1
C. The Influence ofIntrastate Conflicts and International
Action in the 1990s
In introducing the doctrine, the ICISS points specifically to
four major international incidents in the 1990s that set the stage for
the establishment of the responsibility to protect - Somalia,
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo.32 In early 1992, the U.N. deemed
the civil war in Somalia to be a threat to international security, and
the U.N. Security Council authorized humanitarian action. Over
fourteen months the U.N. continued its efforts by signing multiple
resolutions calling for combatants to cease fire and sending troops
to oversee conflict resolution. 34  The failure of the U.N. to
successfully resolve the conflict in Somalia is generally attributed
to disorganization and obscure policy directives.
As the U.N. withdrew from Somalia, civil war broke out in
newly-formed Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnia)." The U.N. was
initially involved in the peace-keeping efforts in Bosnia,
28 Id.
29 See id.
30 See A Short History of NA TO, supra note 25.
31 Id.
32 ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 1.1-4.
33 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 794,1 1-12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992).
34 See id.
35 See id.; Ved P. Nanda, Thomas F. Muther, Jr., & Amy E. Eckert, Tragedies in
Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Liberia - Revisiting the Validity of
Humanitarian Intervention Under International Law - Part II, 26 DENV. INT'L J. L. &
POL'Y 827, 837 (1998) [hereinafter Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian
Intervention].
36 Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 35, at 839-40.
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authorizing no-fly zones and imposing sanctions in the region.17
However, due to a lack of resources and political will on the part
of the U.N., the reconciliation efforts in Bosnia were primarily led
by the United States and NATO.
In 1994, human rights violations in Rwanda made waves on an
international scale.39 Despite the fact that the U.N. Security
Council knew that genocide was looming in Rwanda and had the
ability to prevent or mitigate the genocide, the U.N. refused to
sanction military intervention that could have halted the killings.40
More than 800,000 people were killed,41 and 1.5 million people
were displaced.42
In the mid-1990s, as NATO finished its mission in Bosnia,
tensions rose in Kosovo. 43  In 1996 the terrorist group Kosovo
Liberation Army began attacks on Serb authorities that continued
well into 1997.44 Throughout 1998, the United States threatened
military action against Serbia, and in March of 1998, the U.N.
approved Resolution 1160, imposing sanctions on Yugoslavia."
As the attacks continued through the summer of 1998, thousands
of Albanian civilians were displaced and took refuge in other
states.46  In September 1998, the U.N. passed Resolution 1199
calling for a cease-fire, and when the violence continued, NATO
started preparing for airstrikes in Kosovo.47 After a final peace
talk failed, NATO began airstrikes in Kosovo in March 1999.48
After seventy-eight days, the President of Serbia and the Kosovo
37 Id. at 840.
38 Id. at 841.
39 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 1.1.
40 Id.; Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 35, at 851.
41 Genocide in Rwanda, UNITED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, http://www.unitedhum
anrights.org/genocide/genocide-in-rwanda.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
42 Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 35, at 848.
43 See A Kosovo Chronology, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline
/shows/kosovo/etc/cron.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
44 Id.
45 Id. See S.C. Res. 1160, $l 8-9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 160 (Mar. 31, 1998).
46 Id.; Timeline: Kosovo, BBC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2012, 15:32 GMT), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/countryprofiles/3550401.stm.
47 S.C. Res. 1199, % 3-6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 199 (Sept. 23, 1998). See A Kosovo
Chronology, supra note 43.
48 A Kosovo Chronology, supra note 43; Timeline: Kosovo, supra note 46.
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Liberation Army agreed to withdraw and disarm.49
D. The Establishment of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty
The ICISS places strong emphasis on the influence of the 1999
intervention in Kosovo - "NATO's intervention in Kosovo in
1999 brought the controversy [over humanitarian intervention] to
its most intense head"so - and the timeline supports that." In
September 1999, the same month that the intervention in Kosovo
came to an end, Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United
Nations General Assembly at the time, implored the U.N. to
provide a means by which the international community could act
to protect human rights and security.52 When he repeated his plea
a year later, his requests were heeded, and Canada established the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in
September 2000."
The purpose of the ICISS was "generally to build a broader
understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for
human protection purposes and sovereignty; more specifically, it
was to try to develop a global political consensus on how to move
from polemics - and often paralysis - towards action within the
international system, particularly through the [U.N.]." 54
The ICISS was comprised of individuals with cultural and
geographic diversity in order to fairly represent the wide range of
opinion and practice worldwide, and was tasked with considering
legal, moral, operational, and political issues.ss The ICISS
published its report in December 2001, presenting its findings, and
advocating for an approach to humanitarian intervention that has
now become commonly known as the responsibility to protect."
III.Modern Conception of the Doctrine
The responsibility to protect broadly provides that when a state
49 Timeline: Kosovo, supra note 46.
50 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at Vil.
51 See id. at 2; Herron, supra note 6, at 371.
52 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 1.6.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at VII, §§ 1.7-.8.
56 Id. at VIII.
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cannot or will not take responsibility for the safety and protection
of its citizens, the international community bears a responsibility
to act to prevent or curtail serious human suffering.s" The action
warranted depends on the nature and character of the suffering,"
but prevention is the cornerstone of the responsibility to protect.
Peaceful means of protection should always be exhausted before
forceful or military interventions are considered; avoiding
intrusion is a top priority of the responsibility to protect.59
A. Legal Foundations for the Responsibility to Protect
Despite there being no formal law on the matter, the ICISS
found that the legal foundation for the responsibility to protect is
derived from several sources.60  First, the concept of state
sovereignty includes a state's responsibility not only to respect
other states' sovereignty, but also to respect the humanity of its
own citizens.6 1 Second, Article 24 of the U.N. Charter charges the
U.N. Security Council with the "responsibility for maintenance of
international peace and security."62 Third, several bodies of
international law govern human rights, including the U.N.
Charter,64 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 65 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Finally, the
ICISS claims that at the time it wrote its report, the practices of
both states and the Security Council showed an emerging pattern
that, while not quite an established doctrine, indicated a
developing principle that is now known as the responsibility to
protect.67 The responsibility to protect has since been incorporated
in Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, adopted by the
57 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XI.
58 See id. at XII.
59 Id. at XI.
60 Id. at XI, §§ 2.21-.23.
61 Id. § 1.15.
62 U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 2; See ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XI.
63 ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 1.16-17.
64 See U.N. Charter, Preamble, art. 1, para. 3.
65 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/3/217 A (Dec. 10, 1948).
66 Int'l Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(1967).
67 ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 2.24-27.
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U.N. General Assembly in 2005.68 While not binding, the
resolution provides evidence that the responsibility to protect is an
emerging legal norm that may be gaining acceptance as customary
international law.69 The Resolution reflects the responsibilities and
principles provided by the ICISS in its 2001 report, and adds "[w]e
stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration
of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the [United
Nations] Charter and international law."o
This reflects the notion that the responsibility to protect is still
a developing area of law.'
B. Perspectives ofResponsibility to Protect
The ICISS found differing perspectives of the doctrine, falling
into roughly three categories: one concerned with human rights,
one concerned with the misuse of power, and one concerned with
operations.7 Those who take the human rights perspective
generally view intervention as an "internationalization of the
human conscience,"" see human rights as more important than
principles of sovereignty, and feel that the international
community should intervene more often.74 Those concerned with
the misuse of power see intervention as "an alarming breach of an
international state order"" and as a manipulation of human rights
principles to allow major powers to disrespect sovereignty
principles.76 Finally, those who subscribe to the operational
approach see matters of legality and effectiveness as the most
important.7 7
68 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, supra notel8, at 138-39;
Stahn, supra note 2, at 100.
69 See Stahn, supra note 2, at 100-01.
70 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1, supra note 18, at 139.
71 See Stahn, supra note 2, at 108-09.
72 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 1.1-8.
73 Id. at VII.
74 Id. §§ 1.1-.8.
75 Id. at VII.
76 Id. § 1.5.
77 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at VII, § 1.5.
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1. Three Elements of the Responsibility to Protect
Three distinct responsibilities make up the responsibility to
protect: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react,
and the responsibility to rebuild." The ICISS notes that these
responsibilities lie primarily with the state itself." The
responsibility to prevent reaffirms that the responsibility to protect
is primarily aimed at peacekeeping and should work to solve the
causes of conflict; the responsibility to react outlines the kind of
action that can be taken under the responsibility to protect and
provides guidelines for military action; and the responsibility to
rebuild describes the steps that should be taken by the international
community to help the target state recover and ensure lasting peace
after a responsibility-to-protect mission."
a. The Responsibility to Prevent
The first priority of the responsibility to protect is always
prevention." Taking preventative action is not only required
before the international community may take further steps, such as
intervention, but the preventative effort adds credibility to actions
taken beyond preventative measures. However, the point at
which the international community should begin taking
preventative measures is not always clear; the responsibility to
prevent human rights violations lies with the state itself, and the
responsibility of the international community to act is not triggered
until it is clear that the state is "unwilling or unable" to act on its
own to avert "serious harm."" But stalling international action
until it is clear that a state is unwilling or unable to act may allow
the time for prevention to pass, especially in cases in which the
state's own government is the entity responsible for committing
human rights violations. The tension caused by this ambiguity is
best addressed by one of the three conditions the ICISS found to
be essential for successful prevention efforts-"early warning," or
knowledge of the conflict situation.84 Several non-governmental
78 Id. at XI.
79 Id. § 3.2.
80 Id. at XI.
81 Id.
82 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 3.3.
83 Id. at XI.
84 Id. § 3.6.
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organizations (NGOs) have been created specifically to provide
early warning of conflict situations warranting prevention efforts,
and Article 99 of the U.N. Charter requires the Secretary-General
to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter that in
his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace
and security.""
The ICISS is candid about the weaknesses in early warning
methods." First, early warning efforts are often unstructured,
misguided, and incomplete. Second, a variety of organizations
and entities participate in early warning efforts, but there is little or
no coordination among the groups, and the quality of information
is inconsistent." Finally, even when the early warning information
about a conflict situation is available, the information must be
analyzed and put to use in planning prevention efforts." This
"analysis and translation" phase is, according to the ICISS, the
crux of the problem." One suggestion for improving the early
warning system is involvement of state governments, but the
ICISS expresses concern over whether states would be willing to
share information and whether that information could be trusted.9 1
Further, as new technologies continue to develop, it is impossible
to predict the ease with which any entity, be it an NGO, a state
government, or a party of the U.N., is able to determine the status
of a conflict situation.
The second of the three conditions the ICISS found to be
essential for successful prevention efforts is the "preventive
toolbox," or an "understanding of the policy measures available
that are capable of making a difference." 92 The ICISS divides
prevention efforts into two categories: those directed at preventing
root causes of conflict and those directed at preventing direct
85 Id. § 3.14; U.N. Charter art. 99.
86 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 3.12.
87 See id. § 3.13. ("Preventive action is founded upon and proceeds from accurate
prediction, but too often preventive analysis, to the extent that it happens at all, fails to
take key factors into account, misses key warning signs, (and hence misses opportunities
for early action), or misreads the problem (thereby resulting in application of the wrong
tools).")
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 3.13-.24.
92 Id. § 3.9.
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causes of conflict. 93 Root causes are those underlying the conflict,
such as poverty, while direct causes are those that spark the
conflict.9 4 In both categories, the measures available fall into four
spheres: political and diplomatic, economic, legal, and military.95
Preventative measures aimed at resolving the root causes of
conflict work towards promoting and instilling peace in the
abstract.9 6 Such measures include encouraging reform of legal and
military institutions, promoting equitable distribution of resources,
and support for local action promoting human rights and conflict
resolution.97  Preventative measures designed to address direct
causes of conflict work toward more concrete goals than do those
aimed at resolving root causes.9 8 Those measures include political
or legal sanctions, economic inducements, and adjudication
through the International Criminal Court or some other
international tribunal."
Even when serious conflict is apparent, some entities with the
capabilities and resources to take preventative measures delay
action in the hopes that the conflict will resolve itself..oo This
issue is confronted by the third of the three essential conditions for
successful prevention efforts-"political will."'o' A state or
entity's lack of political will to take action can stem from a
number of factors, including "size and power, geography, and the
nature of the political institutions and culture[.]" 0 2 The more
powerful the state or entity, the less inclined it is to cooperate in
multilateral action.'o3 The farther away the conflict, the less likely
a state or entity will be affected by the conflict; thus, more
distance leads to less cooperation.'04 Various cultures will respond
differently to the quandaries of a suffering population based on
93 Id.
94 Id. § 3.10.
95 Id. §§ 3.11-.12.
96 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 3.18-.24.
97 Id. §§ 3.23-.24.
98 See id. § 3.25.
99 Id. §§ 3.26-.28.
100 Id. § 3. 10.
101 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 3.9.
102 Id. § 8.9.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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similarities the two cultures share, such as language or religion.'
Hesitancy to take preventative action has proven to be very
costly.10 6 In the 1990s, the international community took part in
seven major interventions,107 costing an estimated $200 billion. 0 8
Stalling in those cases nearly tripled the cost of the interventions;
had the international community employed a "more effective
preventative approach," it could have saved $130 billion of what
was spent on conflict management.0 9
The ICISS discusses four interests to which the international
community may appeal in order to influence a state to support a
responsibility-to-protect effort: moral interest, financial interest,
national interest, and partisan interest.'o The moral interest in
acting to end human suffering is relatively straight forward; even if
the administration of a particular state is disinterested in the human
suffering within another state, the administration's constituents
may be sufficiently interested such that it is in the administration's
best interest to act."' However, this tactic makes several
assumptions that may not apply to the majority of states
worldwide."12  The ICISS asserts that in appealing to a state's
105 Id.
106 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 3.7 ("The result, according to the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, was that the international community spent
approximately $200 billion on conflict management in seven major interventions in the
1990s (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia
and El Salvador), but could have saved $130 billion through a more effective preventive
approach.")
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. §§ 8.13-.17.
II ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 8.9.
112 "Political leaders often underestimate the sheer sense of decency and compassion
that prevails in their electorates, at least when people's attention is engaged (just as they
also underestimate the public willingness, when well informed, to accept the risk of
casualties in a well designed military intervention aimed at alleviating that suffering).
Getting a moral motive to bite means, however, being able to convey a sense of urgency
and reality about the threat to human life in a particular situation." Id. § 8.13 (emphases
added). First, for an appeal to the morality of an administration's constituents to be
successful, the administration must be one that relies on the votes, or some other
voluntary support, of the citizens of its state. If a political leader is not accountable to his
or her subjects, it is unlikely that public outcry will have any meaningful effect upon that
leader's actions. Even where a leader would be moved to action by public outcry, the
constituents must have access to the information that would trigger a moral
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financial interests in influencing the state to act, it would be
prudent to point out that "earlier action is always cheaper than
later action.""' But again, this appeal rests on assumptions that
may be fatally flawed-that the state will eventually act, and that
the state does not have existing financial incentives not to act.1 14
To act too late is to allow the time for preventative measures to
pass; to act too soon is to violate the sovereignty of another state,
and without adequate justification under the responsibility to
protect. This is the tension inherent in the responsibility to prevent.
b. The Responsibility to React
When preventative measures fail to adequately address human
suffering within a state unwilling or unable to act, the
responsibility to protect provides that the international community
bears a responsibility to take action."s Actions taken in each case
will vary depending on the nature of the human suffering, but
generally fall within categories similar to those in the realm of
preventative measures-political, economic, judicial, and
military." 6  When action is taken under the responsibility to
protect, less intrusive and coercive actions are favored, and should
be exhausted before more intrusive and coercive actions are
taken."' One such non-intrusive action is the imposition of
sanctions." However, some blanket sanctions can exacerbate
human suffering. "' In deciding what action to take, the
international community should consider whether the action would
response. This may be influenced by the administration itself, as well as the income
level and education of the citizens. Still, it must be actually and apparently feasible for
the state to act, otherwise the potential for backlash in response to inaction, which is
presumably what motivates the administration to action, is significantly reduced.
113 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 8.14.
114 For example, Russia and China both have financial interests in preventing an
intervention in Syria. See infra Part IV, section c. Not only would a financial argument
not convince either state to take action in Syria, it may actually reinforce the states'
opposition to action in Syria.
115 ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 4.1-.2.
116 Id. § 4.5. See id. § 3.25.
117 Id. at XI.
118 See id. §§ 4.3-.6.
119 Id. § 4.5 ("Blanket economic sanctions in particular have been increasingly
discredited in recent years as many have noted that the hardships exacted upon the
civilian population by such sanctions tend to be greatly disproportionate to the likely
impact of the sanctions on the behaviour of the principle players.").
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have a greater effect on civilian populations or those causing the
human suffering.12 0  Action should be targeted against those
causing the suffering, and should cause as little harm to civilian
populations as possible.'2 1 Responsibility-to-protect action should
do more to help than to harm the population; if the consequences
of action are likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction,
international action is not justified by the responsibility to
protect. 122
While the principles guiding the execution of responsibility-
to-protect action seem clear, there is little guidance on when
preventative measures are deemed to have failed, and give way to
the responsibility to react.123 The ICISS emphasized that military
action, discussed below, is a last resort; the non-intervention
principle is a default rule, which gives way to responsibility-to-
protect intervention only in the direst of circumstances.12 4  But
guidance on when to apply the less intrusive actions, such as
sanctions, is limited to "[w]hen preventive measures fail to resolve
or contain the situation .... "1 2 5 While it would be impossible to
craft a formula appropriate for every conflict situation that arises,
the lack of direction for responsibility-to-protect action, together
with the uncertainty about when preventative measures should
begin, leaves the international community on uneven footing as it
tries to determine the extent of its role in combating human rights
violations.126
c. The Responsibility to Rebuild
In the extreme cases when the international community
intervenes militarily, the responsibility to protect does not end
when the intervention action is complete. Further action must be
120 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 4.6.
121 Id.
122 Id. at XI, § 4.6.
123 See generally id. § 4.1 ("When preventative measures fail to resolve or contain
the situation and when a state is unable or unwilling to redress the situation, then
interventionary measures by other members of the broader community of states may be
required.").
124 See generally id. §§ 4.10-43 ("In extreme and exceptional cases, the
responsibility to react may involve the need to resort to military action.").
125 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 4.6.
126 See id.
186 Vol. XL
RESPONISBILITY TO PROTECT
taken to ensure that peace is lasting and sustainable.127
Intervention often focuses on the direct causes of conflict, while
efforts to rebuild should be focused on remedying the root causes
of the conflict.128  The central aims of any rebuilding effort are
peacebuilding, security, justice and reconciliation, and
development. 129 Peacebuilding efforts include grass-roots efforts
such as "rebuilding housing, [and] planting and harvesting,"30 as
well as humanitarian efforts aimed at reconciling former
adversaries, promoting unity and inclusiveness, and reintegrating
"displaced persons," like refugees and ex-combatants.'3 ' Security
should be provided to all members of a population, and specific
efforts should be made to prevent enemy populations from
carrying out revenge killings. 3 2 Security efforts should also be
directed at disbanding and rebuilding existing local security
forces.' Justice and reconciliation efforts are directed at
implementing a judicial system to adjudicate further human rights
violations and safeguard the legal rights of the displaced persons
as they return.13 4  Finally, development efforts, including
promoting economic growth and lifting any responsibility-to-
protect economic sanctions or inducements, are aimed at ensuring
the state will recover successfully.'
C. Intervention Under The Responsibility to Protect
It is important to note that the responsibility to protect focuses
on human rights violations occurring in other states, and is entirely
distinct from a state's actions in response to being attacked.'36 in
the latter case, several bodies of existing international law govern
a state's action. 137 The ICISS report was "largely completed" prior
127 See id. § §5.1-.6.
128 See id. § 5.3 ("The objective of such a strategy must be to help ensure that the
conditions that prompted the military intervention do not repeat themselves or simply
resurface.").
129 Id. §§ 5.1-.7.
130 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 5.4
131 Id. §§ 5.1-.6.
132 Id. § 5.6.
133 Id.
134 Id. §§ 5.13-18.
135 ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 5.19-.21.
136 Id. at VII.
137 The ICISS Report discusses the power of self-defense granted by Article 51 of
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to the September 11th attacks in 2001, and the ICISS notes that it
has "no difficulty in principle with focused military action being
taken against international terrorists and those who harbour
them."' However, the ICISS explicitly qualifies that statement,
adding that any such military action should comply with
precautionary principles that guide all military intervention.'
International action taken under the responsibility to protect
does not always include military intervention.'4 0 The non-
intervention principle is a default rule, which gives way to military
action under responsibility to protect only in the direst of
circumstances.14 ' The ICISS seeks to "shift the terms of debate"
from a "right to intervene" to a "responsibility to protect," in an
effort to emphasize the importance of prevention over invasion.'4 2
In addition to emphasizing prevention, this language is aimed at
shifting focus from the rights of intervening countries to the needs
of the victimized population.4 3  The needs of the victimized
population must be great to justify military action: under the "just
cause threshold," military intervention is warranted only when a
population is suffering, or is imminently likely to suffer, a real or
perceived "large-scale loss of life" or "large scale 'ethnic
cleansing,' . . . ."'4 The suffering need not be caused by a
deliberate act of the state to justify intervention.145
When military intervention is warranted, four precautionary
principles guide its execution.146  First, the military intervention
must be primarily directed at ending human suffering.147 Second,
the U.N. Charter and Resolutions 1368 and 1373, in which "the Security Council left no
doubt as to the scope of measures that states could and should take in response." Id. at
VIll, §§ 4.26-.27.
138 Id. at IX.
'39 Id.
140 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII.
141 See generally ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 4.10-.43 (Military intervention
should only be used in extreme cases. Criteria to consider include the "right authority,
just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonably prospects." Id.
§ 4.16).
142 See id. §§ 2.28-33.
143 See id.
144 Id. at XII.
145 Id.
146 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII.
147 Id.
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military intervention must only be exercised as a last resort, after
all non-military means of protection have been exhausted.'
Third, the military intervention must be as narrow as possible in
scale, duration, and intensity to achieve the goal of the
intervention. 14 Finally, the military intervention must be
reasonably likely to succeed and not likely to cause more harm
than the default of inaction would cause.'so
To satisfy the final two requirements, the military intervention
must be authorized by proper authority,"' and it must follow
proper operation principles.'5 2 The ICISS Report states that the
U.N. Security Council is the best and most appropriate body to
authorize military intervention."' The U.N. Security Council is
still accepted as the designated body for granting authorization, but
NATO has played a central role in many of the interventions since
the 1990s and is equally involved in operational principles.5 4
Proper operational principles described by the ICISS include:
precision, clarity, unambiguity, proportionality, clear
communication, unity, coordination, and adherence to
international law. 55
While the 2001 stance of the ICISS expressly designated
military intervention as a last resort,' 56 NATO adopted a new
Strategic Concept for crisis management in 2010 that
recommended member states invest in and help develop "the
capabilities necessary to defend against ballistic missile attacks
and cyber attacks."' 5  In a post-9/11 world,'"8 in which rapid
148 See id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII
152 Id. at XIlII.
153 See id. at XII. The report describes the procedures both to be followed by one
wishing to obtain authorization, and by the Council to grant authorization. Id. at XII-
XIII.
154 See A Short History ofNA TO, supra note 25.
155 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XIII.
156 Id. at XII.
157 NA TO Adopts New Strategic Concept, NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
(Nov. 19, 2010), available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news68172.htm.
158 See generally 10 Ways The World Has Changed Since 9/11, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/10-seismic-changes-
since-911/2013/09/10/4499cfl8-19b4-1 le3-82ef-a059e54c49d0 galiery.html#photo=1
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technological advancement creates an environment of
uncertainty-and even fear-a recommendation to be vigilant in
developing and maintaining defense tactics is neither surprising
nor necessarily inconsistent with the last-resort approach to
military action. As technology advances, military capabilities will
far surpass what was imaginable even in 2000 when the ICISS was
writing their report.15 9 Preparation is key to the success of any
international action, especially for a prevention-based approach.6 o
However, the international community should remain wary of an
approach that too eagerly anticipates an attack so as not to resort to
military action that surpasses what is allowed by the responsibility
to protect.
IV. Modern Application of the Doctrine
A serious concern about military intervention under the
responsibility to protect is the inconsistency of application."' One
perspective of intervention is that a state should only intervene
when its vital national interests are at stake.16 2 A conflicting view
is that action under the responsibility to protect should be
"unsullied by [a state's] interests."' 6  Max Boot, Senior Fellow at
(recounting the ways the United States has changed since Sept. 11, 2001, particularly a
technological and intelligence boom and participation in the War on Terror prominently
in the Middle East).
159 For example, the use of armed drones in military action is a relatively new
practice and has led to much controversy and discussion. See John Sifton, A Brief
History of Drones, THE NATION (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article
/166124/brief-history-drones#. Though drone technology existed when the ICISS report
was written, drones were unarmed and used for non-aggressive purposes, like
surveillance, at the time. Id. The first use of a drone by the CIA in a targeted killing
took place in early 2002. Id. Drone technology has continued to evolve since 2002, and
it will continue to evolve in the future. See Anna Mulrine, Not Your Average Drone:
New Technology the US Military is Developing, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec.
6, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1206/Not-your-
average-drone-new-technology-the-US-military-is-developing-video.
160 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 3.9.
161 ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 1.10-23.
162 See Great Decisions in Foreign Policy: Intervention Calculation (Foreign Policy
Association 2013) (streamed using Netflix) (perspective of Max Boot, Council on
Foreign Relations) transcript available at http://www.greatdecisionson
pbs.com/watch/the-intervention-calculation/max-boot/.
163 See id., (quoting Danielle Pletka, American Enterprise Institute) transcript
available at http://www.greatdecisionsonpbs.com/watch/sacred-cow-defending-america-
on-a-budget/danielle-pletkal.
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the Council on Foreign Relations, suggests that-at least from the
standpoint of action taken by the United States-the vitality of an
interest is not as important in determining whether to intervene as
the plausibility of success.'" For a "less capable" adversary, the
United States is faster to intervene; to take on a powerful
adversary like China, Boot believes the threat to interests would
need to be "close to Armageddon" to prompt a U.S.-led military
intervention."'
Putting aside the difficulties in defining a "vital" national
interest,166 it is impossible to ignore the relationship between a
state's economic and strategic interests, and the state's willingness
to follow through with a responsibility-to-protect intervention.'67
Former National Security Advisor James Jones sees intervention
as having three pillars: security, economics, and governance and
rule of law.'16  Even though the Right Intention Principle 69
demands that the primary purpose of responsibility-to-protect
intervention be to end human suffering, economic and strategic
interests often match, if not overshadow, the humanitarian interests
motivating intervention. 17 0  Indeed, when the economic and
strategic interests of powerful states do not align, a state that
would suffer economically or strategically if intervention were
carried out may take specific steps to impede an intervention,
despite dire need for humanitarian aid. '7
Economic and strategic interests should not be ignored, and
these interests are acknowledged by the ICISS report in its
164 Max Boot, supra note 162.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Great Decisions in Foreign Policy: Intervention Calculation (Foreign Policy
Association 2013) (streamed using Netflix) (perspective of Jonathan Tepperman,
Economist) transcript available at http://www.greatdecisionsonpbs.com/watch/power-to-
the-people-the-new-egypt/jonathan-tepperman/.
168 Id. (quoting General James Jones, Former National Security Advisor) transcript
available at http://www.greatdecisionsonpbs.com/watch/the-intervention-
calculation/general-james-jones/.
169 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII.
170 See generally Great Decisions in Foreign Policy: Intervention Calculation
(Foreign Policy Association 2013) (streamed using Netflix) ("It becomes the
responsibility of the world community to protect citizens from mass atrocities when an
individual government cannot fulfill its obligation; nevertheless, other considerations are
vital in deciding whether to take affirmative action, including ability and will.").
171 See infra Part IV, section c.
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requirement that military intervention be reasonably likely to
succeed.17 2 But economic and strategic interests should only be
considered once humanitarian interests have prompted a military
response, rather than themselves prompting a military response.'73
Further, the consideration of economic and strategic interests
should relate to the feasibility of intervention, and not whether the
intervening state or states stand to gain from a political change or
recovery of resources in the target nation.174 Military intervention
under the responsibility to protect is not justified by a desire to
protect a state's economic or strategic interests.'7 ' Economist
Jonathan Tepperman argues that the economic and strategic
interests "are almost inextricably intertwined."' 7 6  He points out
that economic and strategic interests were present in the
interventions in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Libya, and Iraq. 77
Specifically, Tepperman notes that the disruption caused by
Bosnia in the 1990s was dangerous both politically and
economically, making the decision to intervene "an easy call for
the U.S.""'7 If Tepperman is right, this is a disturbing trend that
flies in the face of what the responsibility to protect was designed
to do: emphasize peaceful prevention over conflict and protect
human security.179
A. Operation Unified Protector: Successful Intervention in
Libya
NATO's 2011 intervention in Libya is widely considered to
have been a highly successful intervention. 0  The need for
172 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 Id.; Jonathan Tepperman, supra note 167.
177 Jonathan Tepperman, supra note 167.
178 Id.
179 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII.
180 David Rieff, RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMEs (Nov. 7,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/Responsibility-to-Protect-rip.html
?pagewanted=all&_r-l& ("The decision by the U.N. Security Council and NATO to end
military operations in Libya on Oct. 31 concludes what appears to be the most successful
foreign humanitarian intervention since the quagmires in Afghanistan and Iraq soured
much of the Western public on such undertakings."); See generally Ivo H. Daalder &
James G. Stavridis, NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to RUN.an Intervention,
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intervention in Libya went largely unquestioned."' Muammar el-
Qaddafi'12  first took power over Libya in 1969 and almost
immediately demanded that states with forces in Libya, including
the United States and the United Kingdom, withdraw troops or
face war.' In the first 26 years that Qaddafi ruled Libya, he
attempted to overthrow Sudan's government, 84 participated in
Chad's 20-year civil war,' was implicated in terrorist bombings
in Rome, Vienna, and Berlin,'8 6 carried out the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103, killing 270 people,'87 gave refuge to those accused
(and later convicted) of carrying out the Pan Am bombing,' and
exiled Palestinians from Libya, leaving some stranded at sea.18 9 In
February 2011, Libyan citizens began to revolt.' 90 When protests
broke out in Benghazi, Qaddafi's regime attacked protestors by
aircraft.' 9 ' Qaddafi promised the Libyan citizens, "either I rule
91 FOREIGN AFF. 2 (2012), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/137073/ivo-h-daalder-and-james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya (hailing the operation
as a "model intervention" because it rapidly succeeded in protecting civilians and aiding
local forces militarily).
181 A Short History of NA TO, supra note 25 ("In the new Strategic Concept agreed
in 2010, the Alliance committed itself to dealing with 'all stages of a crisis - before,
during and after' - an all-embracing principle that implies a greater role for cooperative
security."); see Rieff, supra note 180 ("Qaddafi's threat in March to unleash a bloodbath
in rebel-held Benghazi was just the kind of extreme instance that [responsibility to
protect]'s framers had in mind."); see generally Ivo H. Daalder & James G. Stavridis,
NATO's Success in Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/10/31/opinion/31iht-eddaalder31.html (citing 18 countries that participated in
the NATO operation in Libya).
182 Also spelled Gadhafi. See, e.g., Hannah Allam, Warren P. Strobel, & Jonathan S.
Landay, Obama Orders Freeze on assets of Gadhafi, His Family, MCCLATCHY DC (Feb.
25, 2011), available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/02/25/109465/tripoli-under-
siege-as-gadhafis.htmi.
183 Jeffery Delviscio, Rogene Fisher Jacquette, & Lori Moore, Timeline: Col.
Muammar el-Qaddai, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2011/02/24/world/middleeast/20110224_qaddafitimeline.html.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Delviscio, Jacquette, & Moore, supra note 183.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 Libya Profile, BBC NEWS AFRICA (Nov. 25, 2013), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 13755445.
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over you, or I kill you, or I destroy you."'9 2 As thousands of
protestors closed in on the capital, Qaddafi's forces opened fire on
the crowds, and took protestors as hostages.'9 3 Days after
Qaddafi's attacks on protestors began, the U.N. imposed sanctions
on Qaddafi and ordered an investigation into potential war crimes
in Libya.194  Two days after the U.N. unanimously imposed
sanctions, Qaddafi employed special forces, army troops, and
fighter jets to combat the protestors.'9 ' Estimates of the death toll
resulting from the Libyan Civil War range from 10,000"' to
50,000.197 Three weeks after the Libyan Civil War began, the
Arab League requested that the U.N. establish a no-fly zone over
Libya.'98 Four days later, on March 17, 2011, the U.N. authorized
military intervention in Libya.' 99 Libyan citizens in Benghazi
rejoiced.20 0
Military intervention led by the United States began just two
days after the U.N.authorized the international community to take
"all necessary measures" to protect Libyan citizens.2 0' On March
27, 2011, NATO assumed control of the intervention, called
"Operation Unified Protector", and by October 31, 2011, the
Libyan National Transitional Council had taken control of Libya,
192 Allam, Strobel, & Landay, supra note 182.
193 Delviscio, Jacquette, & Moore, supra note 183; Allam, Strobel, & Landay, supra
note 182.
194 Delviscio, Jacquette, & Moore, supra note 183.
'95 Id.
196 Libya Death Toll Could Be As High As 30,000: US., HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27,
2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/27/libya-death-toll-could-be_n_854582.
html.
197 Kim Sengupta, Rebel Leaders Put Libya Death Toll at 50,000, THE INDEPENDENT
(Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/rebel-leaders-put-
libya-death-toll-at-50000-2346590.html.
198 Delviscio, Jacquette, & Moore, supra note 183.
199 Id.; Dan Bilefsky, Mark Landler, David D. Kirkpatrick, Kareem Fahim, Helene
Cooper, Elisabeth Bumiller, & Steven Lee, As UN. Backs Military Action in Libya, US.
Role is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2011/03/18/world/africa/I8nations.html?pagewanted=al.
200 Bilefsky, Landler, Kirkpatrick, Fahim, Cooper, Bumiller, & Lee, supra note 199.
201 Ivo H. Daalder & James G. Stavridis, NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way
to RUN.an Intervention, 91 FOREIGN AFF., 2 (2012), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1 37073/ivo-h-daalder-and-james-g-
stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya.
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and Qaddafi was dead.202 It is worth noting that Qaddafi lost
several key supporters during the intervention, likely contributing
to the success of Operation Unified Protector. Three days after
NATO assumed control of Operation Unified Protector, the
Libyan Foreign Minister, Moussa Koussa, fled to Britain, a move
that was called a "significant blow" to Qaddafi.2 03 One week after
NATO assumed control of Operation Unified Protector, two of
Qaddafi's sons offered a plan for Libya that would involve
stripping Qaddafi of power in favor of a constitutional
democracy.2 04 One of the sons was killed weeks later in a NATO
airstrike.2 05 On October 28, 2011, the NATO Secretary General
gave an official final statement on the end of Operation Unified
Protector.206
The success of the intervention in Libya is often attributed to
NATO's quick response and its coordination with both NATO
member states and local states. 207  The intervention involved
eighteen countries, and the support of the Transitional National
Council and the Arab League.2 08 Past interventions have seen one
state play a majority role, with little help from allied states, but
Operation Unified Protector was truly a collective effort.209 While
the United States played a key role in Operation Unified Protector
202 Id.
203 Thomas Harding & Robert Winnett, Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa
defects to Britain, THE TELEGRAPH (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8417350/Libyan-foreign-minister-Moussa-
Koussa-defects-to-Britain.html; Jeffery Delviscio, Rogene Fisher Jacquette, & Lori
Moore, Timeline: Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/02/24/world/middleeast/20110224
qaddafi_timeline.html.
204 Delviscio, Jacquette, & Moore, supra note 183.
205 Id.
206 NATO Secretary General statement on end of Libya mission, NORTH ATLANTIC
TREATY ORGANIZATION (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news
80052.htm.
207 Daalder & Stavridis, supra note 181.
208 Daalder & Stavridis, supra note 180.
209 Id. ("[I]n NATO's war in Kosovo, The United States was responsible for
dropping 90 percent of all precision-guided munitions, with other allies responsible for
the remaining 10 percent. In Operation Unified Protector, the percentages were reversed:
Allies struck 90 percent of the more than 6,000 targets destroyed in Libya."); see also
Great Decisions, supra note 170 (The United States provides security worldwide, but in
the Libya case the interest of U.S. allies outweighed U.S. interests regarding
intervention.).
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by providing a majority of the intelligence data and jet fuel,2 10
these efforts were important primarily in enabling other states to
take part in the intervention.2 11 France and Britain together took
about a third of the mission's 6,000 targets, and Italy and Greece
provided air bases for the hundreds of aircrafts used in the
missions.212 Even Arab Partners, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar,
Jordan, and Morocco participated in the intervention.2 13 Those
who view Operation Unified Protector as a success expect such
coordination to continue in future interventions.2 14
B. Operation Unified Protector: A Violation ofResponsibility
to Protect Principles?
Notwithstanding the perceived success in Libya, the intentions
of the United States' Administration may not have been
completely pure, and not everyone believes that the intervention in
Libya was within the bounds of the responsibility to protect.215
210 Daalder & Stavridis, supra note 181 ("In Libya, Washington provided 75 percent
of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data employed to protect Libyan
civilians and enforce the arms embargo. It also contributed 75 percent of the refueling
planes used throughout the mission -- without which strike aircraft could not have
lingered near potential targets in order to respond quickly to hostile forces threatening to
attack civilians. And U.S. commanders in Europe had to quickly dispatch over 100
military personnel to the NATO targeting center at the outset of the intervention when it
became clear that other member states lacked the knowledge and expertise to provide
their aircraft with the correct targeting information.").
211 Daalder & Stavridis, supra note 180.
212 Id
213 Id.
205 Jonathan Tepperman, supra note 167 ("1 would expect to see more missions like
Libya in the years ahead; that is, if there is a stomach for further interventions, they will
be NATO interventions and broad multilateral interventions, rather than lone American
ones.").
215 E.g., Great Decisions in Foreign Policy: Intervention Calculation (Foreign
Policy Association 2013) (streamed using Netflix) (quoting Colum Lynch), transcript
available at http://www.greatdecisionsonpbs.com/watch/the-intervention-calculation/
colum-lynch/ ("The Russians, the Chinese, the South Africans,... the Brazilians, and
the Indians have been much less supportive of the whole outcome; they have seen it as
sort of a violation of the principle of Responsibility to Protect .... [I]t seems evident to
me, and the U.S. government I don't think accepts this, that this went far beyond
Responsibility to Protect. I think it's also a bit naive to think that if you use military
force in the name of Responsibility to Protect, that you can somehow limit what a
military does to the letter of the law. In the sense that you send the military force in, and
militaries are trained to achieve decisive military objectives ... [a]nd that meant going
after military targets, going after hitting family members, chasing down Qaddafi and
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Despite the fact that the intervention was purportedly aimed at
protecting civilians, protection was given on a political basis: only
those civilians supporting the opposition were protected."' This is
a violation of the responsibility to protect on several planes. First,
the primary purpose of responsibility-to-protect intervention is to
save lives.217 Crucially, the ICISS has refused to draw lines
between cases in which the human rights violations are
deliberately carried out by the state and cases in which the
violations result from the failure or collapse of a state.2 18  The
refusal to distinguish, for responsibility-to-protect intervention
purposes, between two situations that appear politically distinct,
demonstrates the ICISS's commitment to restrict responsibility-
to-protect interventions to humanitarian efforts, to the exclusion of
political agendas. 219  Further, the ICISS explicitly refuses to
sanction intervention in the absence of large-scale loss of life, even
where "a population, having clearly expressed its desire for a
democratic regime, is denied its democratic rights by a military
take-over." 2 20 Again, this demonstrates the ICISS's commitment
to carrying out interventions only to end human suffering, rather
than effectuating regime change. Finally, responsibility-to-
protect intervention should strive to protect "all members of a
population, regardless of ethnic origin or relation to the previous
source of power in the territory." 2 2' Arguably, under these
principles and the principle that intervention should be driven by
prevention over action, utilizing the least intrusive means possible,
trying to kill him himself. And so these are things that go beyond what most people
would've thought Responsibility to Protect entailed.").
216 Id.; Herron, supra note 6, at 368.
217 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 4.1.
218 Id. § 4.22.
219 The ICISS report notes that "[w]hile the initial mandate may reflect a
preoccupation with human protection, political and security concerns sooner or later
predominate." ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 7.17. See Alex J. Bellamy, The
Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Regime Change, E-INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/27/the-responsibility-to-
protect-and-the-problem-of-regime-change/# fin4 ("The principal objections to the 2001
report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty which
coined the phrase responsibility to protect came from states and commentators worried
about the widened potential for abuse that may accompany any relaxing of the general
prohibition on force contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter.")
220 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 4.26.
221 Id.§ 5.8.
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Operation Unified Protector should have ended as soon as
Qaddafi's sons offered to replace Qaddafi with a constitutional
democracy for Libya.2 22 NATO's incomplete and politically
driven protection for civilians in Libya not only contradicted the
explicit goals of responsibility-to-protect intervention, but it
looked shockingly similar to an atrocity that responsibility-to-
protect rebuilding efforts should work to prevent - "reverse ethnic
cleansing."22 3
Not only was the political favoritism evident in the Libyan
intervention a violation of responsibility-to-protect principles, it
made waves in the international community.22 4 Russia and China
have perceived the Libyan intervention as a "trick" - the
discussion leading up to the intervention focused on humanitarian
issues, as demanded by the responsibility to protect, but the
intervention itself seemed to focus on regime change.2 25 Besides
Russia and China, numerous states, including India, Brazil, and
South Africa, which supported intervention, have come to view the
Libyan intervention as a violation of the responsibility to protect
and an effort to overthrow a regime unfavorable to western
interests under the guise of humanitarian intervention.22 6 Both
American and European companies stood to benefit from a "more
pro-western" Libyan administration.2 27 Libya's oil reserves are the
largest known in Africa,22 8 and about 40% of the United States'
imported oil in 2011 came from the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries, 2 29 of which Libya is a member. 230  David
222 David D. Kirkpatrick, 2 Qaddafi Sons Are Said to Offer Plan to Push Father
Out, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
04/04/world/africa/04libya.html?&pagewanted=all.
223 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 5.8.
224 Colum Lynch, supra note 215; Great Decisions in Foreign Policy: Intervention
Calculation (Foreign Policy Association 2013) (streamed using Netflix) (perspective of
Chuck Hagel), transcript available at http://www.greatdecision
sonpbs.com/watch/sacred-cow-defending-america-on-a-budget/chuck-hagel/.
225 Chuck Hagel, supra note 224 ("[B]oth Russia and China have used [Operation
Unified Protector] not to go along with tougher U.N. sanction on Syria. 'You clever
fellows tricked us on the Libya thing; you didn't talk about regime change, you talked
about humanitarian issues."').
226 Colum Lynch, supra note 215.
227 Great Decisions, supra note 170.
228 Libya, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION (Oct. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=ly.
229 Neelesh Nerurkar, U.S. Oil knports and Exports, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
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Ignatius, editor and columnist at the Washington Post, pointed out
that while the NATO intervention in Libya was a "limited
success," the real interest in Libya, for the United States, is to keep
the oil flowing at low prices. 231 The international community is
not blind to the economic and strategic interests of the United
States and other Western states, and responds accordingly. For
some states, mistrust of Western motivations behind intervention
has sparked reluctance to intervene in Syria.232 However, other
states have their own improper motivations for inaction.
C. Inconsistent Application of The Responsibility to Protect:
Making Sense of the Inaction in Syria
What distinguishes Syria from Libya in terms of the
responsibility to protect and intervention is not human rights. To
be sure, Syrian citizens faced human rights violations.2 33 Protests
in Syria began in March 2011, around the time that the U.N.
authorized military action in Libya.2 34  Tactics employed by the
Syrian government against the protestors included the use of
chemical weapons, torture, and executions.235 Opposition forces
led attacks on civilians and also participated in kidnappings,
torture, and executions.2 36 In September and October 2013, two-
and-a-half years into the civil war, the death toll in Syria was
reported to be just above 100,000, with more than 40,000 civilian
lives lost.2 37 The U.N. reported roughly the same number in July
SERVICE, 4-5 (Apr. 4, 2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42465.pdf.
230 Libya, supra note 228.
231 Great Decisions in Foreign Policy: Intervention Calculation (Foreign Policy
Association 2013) (streamed using Netflix) (quoting David Ignatius), transcript
available at http://www.greatdecisionsonpbs.com/watch/sacred-cow-defending-america-
on-a-budget/david-ignatius/.
232 Colum Lynch, supra note 215; Chuck Hagel, supra note 224.
233 See generally Human Rights in Syria, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/middle-eastn-africa/syria (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (recounting
numerous atrocities violating human rights in Syria).
234 Syria Profile, BBC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2013), available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 14703995; Bilefsky, Landler,
Kirkpatrick, Fahim, Cooper, Bumiller, & Lee, supra note 199.
235 Human Rights in Syria, supra note 233.
236 Id.
237 Syrian Death Toll: More than 110,000 Dead in Conflict, NGO Says,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/01/syria-
death-toll n 3851982.html; Laura Stampler, Group Says Syria Death Toll at 115,000,
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2013 before deciding in January 2014 to stop updating the Syrian
death toll, explaining that it could no longer verify the figure due
to its limited access to Syria.238 While the ICISS declined to
quantify "large scale loss of life,"23 9 given that the U.N. authorized
military intervention in Libya when the death toll was estimated to
be 1,000 by rebels, and 150 by Qaddafi, 24 0 any argument that the
civilian deaths in Syria would not satisfy the just threshold
requirement for military intervention under the responsibility to
protect would be baseless. 241
The differences in Syria and Libya are strategic, economic, and
political. In October 2011, when the death toll in Syria was
estimated at 3,000, the U.N. Security Council voted on a
resolution that condemned "continued grave and systematic human
rights violations by the Syrian authorities."24 2 The Resolution was
vetoed by both Russia and China.243 The Security Council voted
again in February 2012, and the Resolution was again vetoed by
Russia and China.24 Both Russia and China walked out of the
August 2013 U.N. Security Council meeting at which Great
Britain would have introduced a resolution authorizing military
intervention in Syria.24 5 In part, the unwillingness of Russia and
China to consider responsibility-to-protect intervention in Syria
can be attributed to a shared mistrust of American intentions.2 46
Both states have publicly stated their shared belief that the U.S. is
TIME, )Oct. 1, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/10/01/group-says-syria-death-toll-at-
115000/.
238 Laura Stampler, UN.To Stop Updating Syria Death Toll, TIME (Jan. 7, 2014),
http://world.time.com/2014/01/07/un-to-stop-updating-syria-death-toll/.
239 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 4.20.
240 U.N. Authorizes 'All Necessary Measures' in Libya, USA TODAY (Mar. 18,
2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-03-17-clinton-no-fly-zoneN.
htm.
241 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII.
242 Colum Lynch, Russia, China Block Syria Resolution at the United Nations,
WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/russia-china-block-syria-resolution-at-un/2011/10/04/glQArCFBML-story.html.
243 Id.
244 Holly Yan, Why China, Russia Won't Condemn Syrian Regime, CNN (Feb. 5,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/05/world/meast/syria-china-russia-relations/.
245 Id.
246 Hannah Beech, China's View on Syria Crisis: America's "Hidden Motivations"
Are Leading It Astray, TIME (Sept. 13, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/09/13/chinas-
view-on-syria-crisis-americas-hidden-motivations-are-leading-it-astray/.
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manufacturing reasons to invade Syria.247 In August 2013, Russia
implored the United States to "act sensibly" and to stop striving to
"create artificial groundless excuses for military intervention in the
region .... "2 4 8  In September 2013, People's Daily, a Chinese
news outlet widely regarded as a "mouthpiece" of the Chinese
government, echoed the sentiment when it published an opinion
asserting that the United States' "hidden motivation" for
intervention was Syria's alliance with Iran, "America's regional
rival," calling the allegation of Syria's use of chemical weapons a
rumor and an "excuse for America to launch an attack on Syria."2 49
The mistrust of the United States' intentions, shared by Russia and
China, is not without foundation. Colum Lynch, responsible for
U.N. coverage at the Washington Post, has explained that from the
standpoint of Russia and China, the United States has begU.N.to
establish a pattern, through its overthrow of Hussein in Iraq and
Qaddafi in Libya, in which the U.S. is willing to use force to
overthrow a regime unfavorable to American interests. 250 Not only
does this allow the United States to expand its global reach, but it
also allows the U.S. to intrude upon Russian and Chinese
interests.25 1
An interest in disrupting an American-led intervention is not
the only reason Russia and China oppose intervention in Syria. In
addition, both states have strong economic and strategic incentives
to maintain friendly relations with Syria.2 52 Russia's relationship
with Syria is worth billions of dollars. 253  Russia made an
estimated $162 million in both 2009 and 2010 through its arms
dealing in Syria, $19.4 billion through investments in tourism and
energy, $550 million in a 2012 sale of combat jets to Syria, and
expects another estimated $4 billion to $5 billion from its arms
247 Id.
248 Military Intervention in Syria Bypassing UNSC Would be Catastrophic -
Russian Diplomat, RUSSIA BEYOND THE HEADLINES (Aug. 27, 2013), available at
http://rbth.ru/news/2013/08/27/militaty_intervention-insyria-bypassing-unscwouldb
e_catastrophic_- ru_29242.html.
249 Beech, supra note 246.
250 Colum Lynch, supra note 215.
251 Id.
252 Yan, supra note 244.
253 Id.; Daniel Treisman, Why Russia Supports Syria's Assad, CNN (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/02/opinion/treisman-russia-syria.
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dealing with Syria.2 54 Russia is also motivated to protect its only
naval base on the Mediterranean in Tartus, Syria. 25 5  As the third
largest importer to Syria in 2010,256 and the largest importer to
Russia in 2013,257 China has economic interests in both Syria and
Russia. Not only does China have economic incentives to
maintain friendly ties with Syria, but Syria supported China
through allegations of human rights violations and criticisms of
China's response to uprisings in Tibet.258 Further, China stated
that it "always oppose[s] the use of force in international
relations."259 When the U.N. authorized action in Libya, both
Russia and China abstained from the vote. 2 60  The explanation
commonly advanced for China's hands-off approach to
international affairs is its own .desire to be left alone by the
international community.261
D. The Influence ofPower on the Decision to Take Action
Under The Responsibility to Protect.
The Russian and Chinese vetoes are not the only thing
preventing an intervention in Syria.26 2 The inaction of the
international community in the face of ongoing human rights
violations in Syria gives credence to Max Boot's position that the
community will be more likely to intervene when faced with an
easy win.263 Not only does Syria have a military that surpasses
that of Libya, but its ties to Russia and China would prove
254 Yan, supra note 244; Treisman, supra note 253.
255 Treisman, supra note 253; Colum Lynch, supra note 215.
256 Yan, supra note 244.
257 Daniel Pena, China's Syria Strategy, HUFFINGTON PosT (Sept. 16, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-pena/china-syria-b_3923162.html.
258 See Yan, supra note 244; Simon Elegant, China and Tibet: The Spin Campaign,
TIME (Mar. 26, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599
,1 725650,00.html.
259 Beech, supra note 246.
260 Bilefsky, Landler, Kirkpatrick, Fahim, Cooper, Bumiller, & Lee, supra note 199.
261 Beech, supra note 246 ("When it comes to international affairs, China has tended
to either retire from the limelight or snipe from the sidelines."); See, e.g.,Yan, supra note
244 (China "vetoed a draft resolution that would have demanded Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad stop killing and answer calls .... [for] reasons to maintain good relations with
Syria.").
262 David Ignatius, supra note 23 1.
263 Max Boot, supra note 162.
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problematic even if those states abstained from the vote.2 6
Beyond the opposition of Russia and China, a Syrian intervention
would not be met with the kind of regional support garnered by
NATO for the Libyan intervention, either by way of neighboring
states or regional organizations. 265  Further, an intervention would
likely spur Assad to move the fighting into nearby Lebanon and
Iraq.266 While the inaction with regard to Syria is at the very least
impliedly (and arguably expressly) condoned by the principle that
military action should only be taken when success is likely, and
will not cause more harm than good,267 this approach provides
powerful states and their allies a high degree of influence to
determine, based on their own interests, when human rights
violations will be ignored and when they will not be tolerated.
First, China, Russia, and the United States, widely accepted as
the three most powerful states in the world,268 are each permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council, meaning they have veto
power over any Security Council Resolution proposing action
under the responsibility to protect. 269  While the ICISS implores
the Permanent Five members of the Security Council not to apply
their veto to block responsibility-to-protect action "where their
264 Great Decisions in Foreign Policy: Intervention Calculation (Foreign Policy
Association 2013) (streamed using Netflix) (perspective of Ivo Daalder, U.S. Permanent
Representative on the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)),
transcript available at http://www.greatdecisionsonpbs.com/watch/nato-and-the-u-s-in-
the-2 I st-century/ivo-daalder/.
265 Delviscio, Jacquette, & Moore, supra note 183 (demonstrating that the United
Arab Emirates, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, The Arab League, and Libyan National
Transitional Council all either supported or participated in the intervention); Daalder &
Stavridis, supra note 181; Daalder & Stavridis, supra note 180.
266 Id.
267 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII.
268 See What are the Most Powerful Countries in The World, MARKET Bus. NEWS
(Nov. 21, 2013), http://marketbusinessnews.com/most-powerful-countries-world/3447
(listing the United States, Russia, and China as the most powerful states in the world,
respectively); The 10 Most Powerful Militaries in The World, Bus. INsIDER (June. 12,
2013, 12:28 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/10-most-powerful-militaries-in-the-
world-2013-6?op-1 (listing the United States, Russia, and China, as the states with the
most powerful militaries, respectively); The World's Most Powerful People, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/powerful-people/list/ (listing the Presidents of Russia, the United
States, and China as the three most powerful people in the world, respectively).
269 United Nations Security Council: Current Members, UNITED NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2014); ICISS Report, supra
note 1, at XIII.
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vital state interests are not involved," 27 0 this is not binding, and in
any case, it can be difficult to define what interests are "vital."2 7 1
Even if other global leaders that oppose intervention in Syria, such
as India and Brazil,272 - both opposed to action in Syria due to
mistrust of Western motives - called for immediate action in
Syria, the standing vetoes from Russia and China could prevent
U.N. authorization.2 73
Second, if the mere fact that a powerful state opposes
intervention is enough to weigh the scales against intervention
based on the unlikelihood of success, powerful states have more
than a legal veto power; they have an absolute veto power on a
pragmatic level. Not only could a decision to intervene in spite of
the opposition cause tension that may lead to further international
conflict, but intervention may not be feasible without the resources
of the powerful state.
For example, in Operation Unified Protector, the United States
provided:
75 percent of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
data employed . . . . 75 percent of the refueling planes used
throughout the mission -- without which strike aircraft could not
have lingered near potential targets in order to respond quickly
to hostile forces threatening to attack civilians. And U.S.
commanders in Europe had to quickly dispatch over 100 military
personnel to the NATO targeting center at the outset of the
intervention when it became clear that other member states
lacked the knowledge and expertise to provide their aircraft with
274the correct targeting information.
The success in Libya may not have been possible without the
270 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XIII.
271 Max Boot, supra note 162.
272 Most Powerful Countries, supra note 268 (stating that India is the eighth most
powerful state in the world according to Market Business News, and has the fourth most
powerful military according to business insider); 10 Most Powerful, supra note 268
(stating that Brazil has the tenth most powerful military according to business insider);
The World's Most Powerful People, supra note 268 (stating that the Presidents of India
and Brazil are considered the 21" and 2 0 th most powerful people in the world,
respectively, according to Forbes).
273 See ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XIII.
274 Ivo H. Daalder & James G. Stavridis, NA TO's Victory in Libya, 91 FOREIGN AFF.
2, (Mar./Apr. 2012), available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137073/ivo-h-
daalder-and-james-g-stavridis/natos-victory-in-libya.
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United States' support and resources.275
Third, if the international community were confronted by a
situation in which human rights violations were occurring in a
particularly powerful state, the international community may be
unable or unwilling to intervene. Danielle Pletka, Vice President
for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, captured this dilemma when discussing the relationship
between China and the United States.276 Pletka notes that while
China poses a serious threat to the United States, the United States
relies heavily on China, and the trouble the United States may
encounter with China is a "total mystery," even to the United
States Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency. 27 7
The extent to which China and the United States are intertwined
bolsters Max Boot's prediction that it would take an Armageddon
for the United States to get involved in a conflict with China.
Indeed, not only are power players Russia, China, and the United
States willing to overlook human rights violations in less powerful
states when it suits them,279 but they are willing to overlook human
rights violations within their own borders and feel reasonably
shielded from international action because of their role in the
global community.
On the other end of the spectrum, powerful states seem
more than willing to take action in less powerful states when they
may benefit from such action. When discussing states that the
United States should be concerned about and where preventative
steps could be taken, General James Jones mentions Nigeria.280
Jones's concerns are not without merit: Nigeria is religiously
divided, has serious problems with piracy and organized crime,
and would affect a large region of Africa if it encountered a
275 See id.
276 See Great Decisions in Foreign Policy: NATO and the US. in the 21st Century
(Foreign Policy Association 2013) (streamed using Netflix) (perspective of Danielle
Pletka, vice-president for foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise
Institute (AEI)), transcript available at http://www.greatdecisionsonpbs.com/watch/
sacred-cow-defending-america-on-a-budget/danielle-pletka/.
277 Id. ("We buy so much from China, we trade so much with China, we
manufacture so much in China. China owns so many of our treasuries. The notion of a
world in which China didn't play this role would be hard to envision at this point.").
278 Max Boot, supra note 162.
279 See supra Part IV, section c.
280 James Jones, supra note 168.
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crisis.28' What makes Jones's concern interesting is not the
likelihood that intervention will become necessary, but what
America stands to gain if it were to become involved in an
intervention in Nigeria.282 Jones specifically mentions Nigeria's
wealth and oil reserves.28 3 It has been observed, not infrequently,
that the United States often acts to preserve its access to the oil
market.284 Further, Jones mentions that there are "a lot of things
that could be put together, between now and that fateful day,"
cheaply, that would allow the United States to "gradually
intervene" in Nigeria.28 These comments are troubling for several
reasons. First, this approach seems clearly contrary to the
principles underlying the responsibility to protect.286 While Jones
does cite several factors that could lead to a conflict, he provides
no information that distinguishes Nigeria from any number of
states worldwide that share these features, or would lead one to
believe that a large-scale loss of life was looming in Nigeria.28 7
Further, the apparent readiness to intervene, gradually or
otherwise, is contrary to the principle of non-intervention. 288 Even
more disturbing, he explicitly references several non-
responsibility-to-protect interests the United States might have in
an intervention in Nigeria that are strikingly similar to the interests
the United States had in the interventions in both Iraq and Libya.289
The inconsistency with which action is taken when the
responsibility to protect is invoked shows that responsibility-to-
protect intervention does not truly turn on human rights, but on the
relative power of the states involved, and the economic and
strategic interests of those states.290 When humanitarian
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Great Decisions in Foreign Policy, supra note 170 ("Maintaining access to
certain markets, especially oil, is a common consideration [of the United States].").
285 James Jones, supra note 168.
286 See supra Part III.
287 See James Jones, supra note 168.
288 See Id.; ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 4.11.
289 See supra Part IV, section b; infra Part V, section b.
290 See Mark P. Lagon, Promoting Human Rights: Is U.S. Consistency Desireable or
Possible?, COUNSEL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, (OCT. 2011) http://www.cfr.org/human-
rights/promoting-human-rights-us-consistency-desirable-possible/p26228 (arguing that a
more consistent human rights policy is actually in the best economic and political interest
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intervention strays from the guiding principles of responsibility to
protect, there are sociological and legal implications.
V. The Effects and Implications of Misuses of the
Responsibility to Protect
A. Ethnocentrism and The Responsibility to Protect
The sociological principle of ethnocentrism29 ' explains the
tendency of humans to judge behaviors and cultures by the
standards of one's own culture and norms, instead of by the norms
of the judged culture.2 92 An ethnocentric viewpoint can result in a
worldview that places higher value on one's own culture and
people than other cultures and their people.293 While
ethnocentrism necessarily permeates all areas of law,294 it has the
potential to be especially hazardous in areas of international law
that allow or suggest that one state act on the basis of another
state's actions and the perceived value of those actions.
Ethnocentric concerns arise in the context of responsibility to
protect when a state places higher value on the lives of its own
citizens than the citizens of another state, or on the people on one
side of a conflict to the degradation of the opposing side. When
ethnocentric motivations lie behind responsibility-to-protect
intervention, international action that should have been aimed at
saving lives can become a modern form of imperialism.2 95
of the U.S.).
291 Coined by William G. Sumner. William Graham Sumner, AM. Soc.
ASSOCIATION, http://www.asanet.org/about/presidents/WilliamSumner.cfm (last visited
Sept. 14, 2014).
292 Elizabeth Elliot Cooper, Ethnocentrism, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES,
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/obo-
9780199766567-0045.xmi (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
293 Id.
294 See Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law
Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 737, 739-40 (1999), available at http://scholarly
commons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac/l151/.
295 See generally Darius Nazemroaya, From the Cold War to NATO's
"Humanitarian Wars" - The Complicity of The United Nations, CENTRE FOR RESEARCH
ON GLOBALIZATION (APR. 4, 2012), available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/from-the-
cold-war-to-nato-s-humanitarian-wars-the-complicity-of-the-united-nations/30114
("Humanitarian wars, especially under the guise of the 'Responsibility to Protect (R2P),'
are a modem form of imperialism. The standard pattern that the United States and its
allies use to execute them is one where genocide and ethnic cleansing are vociferously
alleged by a coalition of governments, media organizations, and non-governmental
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Ethnocentrism often looks like patriotism. 29 6 In the abstract,
ethnocentrism can be seen in the way that states discuss their
relationship to other states. 29 7  An example of American
ethnocentrism is seen in the statements of Danielle Pletka, when
discussing American intervention under the responsibility to
protect.198 After acknowledging that it is impossible to know how
a state or administration will behave because those entities are
made up of humans, Pletka makes several categorical statements
about democracies, in what seems to be an attempt to shed light on
how to predict the behavior that she just labeled unpredictable.29 9
The real solution in the world is to understand that democracies
behave much better than dictatorships. Democratic countries
don't invade other countries. Democratic countries are more or
less accountable to their own people. Democratic countries like
to maximize prosperity, because that's how democrats get re-
elected. And that's the real solution to moving forward with a
more peaceful world - not simply figuring out a better way to
know what everybody's thinking. 30 0
The ethnocentrism is seen clearly in her first statement, which
places higher value on democracies than on dictatorships.30'
Pletka paints democracies in the kindest of lights, implying that
democratic states, such as the United States, pave the path to world
peace, if only other forms of government would fall in line.302
This may be a widely held belief throughout democracies and
western culture, but the veracity of some of Pletka's statements is
in question. What Pletka may have meant when she stated that
democracies do not invade other countries, is that democracies do
organizations. The allegations - often lurid and unfounded - then provide moral and
diplomatic cover for a variety of sanctions that undermine and isolate the target country
in question, and thereby pave the way for military intervention. This is the post-Cold
War modus operandi of the US and NATO.").
296 See John Hutcheson et al., U.S. National Identity, Political Elites, and a Patriotic
Press Following September 11, 21 POL COMM. 27, 27-19 (2004).
297 See Danielle Pletka, supra note 276.
298 See id.
299 See id.
300 Id.
301 It seems clear that when Pletka references democracies, she is referencing the
United States, and possibly other Western states. See id.
302 See Danielle Pletka, supra note 276.
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not invade other countries without justification.3 03 As this
comment has shown, the purported justification for such invasions
is not always sound."* In the same series of interviews, Donald
Rumsfeld, former United States Secretary of Defense, makes a
similar statement when discussing lessons learned through
American action in Afghanistan and Iraq.305
[T]hroughout my adult life, and I've lived a long time, the
United States of America has contributed to a more stable and
peaceful world. We've provided leadership. We've helped
strengthen the rib cage in the globe, and we've done so by
having strengths and recognizing the truth .. .. And if there's a
vacuum, somebody will fill that vacuum. It will either be the
United States or some country other than the United States; and
the odds will be a country that does not think like we do, does
not have our interests first in their mind as we do, and that the
world will be a less safe and less stable place if we do not
provide that kind of leadership.306
Rumsfeld's statements are blatantly colored with
ethnocentrism. His praise for the United States is not unexpected,
given his status as former Secretary of Defense, but it is a romantic
view of the United States, Rumsfeld's own culture, not shared by
leaders worldwide. In 2003, Nelson Mandela, former President of
South Africa and Nobel Peace Prize Winner, called the United
States' actions in Iraq a "tragedy" and criticized the United States
for "committ[ing] unspeakable atrocities" and "undermining the
United Nations."3 07 When Rumsfeld predicts that a state not
aligned ideologically with the United States would create
instability, he places the agenda of the United States above that of
other States and fails to acknowledge that the United States'
actions have created instability in the very context he is
addressing: Iraq.30 s
It is ironic that Rumsfeld glorifies the actions of United States
303 See id.
304 See supra Part IV.
305 Great Decisions in Foreign Policy, supra note 170.
306 Id. (quoting Donald Rumsfeld), transcript available at http://www.greatdecisions
onpbs.com/watch/sacred-cow-defending-america-on-a-budget/donald-rumsfeld/.
307 Jarrett Murphy, Mandela Slams Bush on Iraq, CBS NEWS (Jan. 30, 2003),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/mandela-slams-bush-on-iraq/.
308 Id.
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in the context of Iraq, because not only did the invasion of Iraq
violate the U.N. Charter,309 the United States has demonstrated
spectacular ethnocentrism through its raids in Iraq. First, it should
be noted that the 2003 invasion of Iraq is not justified by the
responsibility to protect, though the United States justified the
invasion on humanitarian grounds."o While the mission in Iraq is
unclear,31' it can be assumed that the mission is directed, at least in
part, at protecting American lives. But in pursuing that "mission,"
countless unarmed civilians in Iraq have been killed in raids and
by drones.312 Each time an Iraqi civilian is killed while American
forces fight for justice for American citizens, the United States
places higher value on the lives of its own citizens than on the
lives of civilians abroad.
But ethnocentric practices in the intervention context are not
limited to action taken by the United States. 3 14  Ethnocentrism
played a central role in the way the intervention in Libya played
out."' When NATO intervened in Libya in 2011, civilians were
not given blanket protection; the intervening forces protected only
those civilians who sided with the rebel opposition." It has been
noted that regime change in Libya was to the benefit of the United
States and the other Western states involved in the NATO
intervention."' When those states prioritized the lives of civilians
309 See supra Part V, section b; Hans Blinx, Iraq Was a Terrible Mistake and
Violation of U.N. Charter, CNN (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03
/I 8/opinion/iraq-war-hans-blix/.
310 Eric A. Heinze, Humanitarian Intervention and the War in Iraq: Norms,
Discourse, and State Practice, 36.1 PARAMETERS 20, 22 (Spring 2006), available at
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/06spring/heinze.pdf
311 See supra Part V, section b.
312 DIRTY WARS (Bertha Foundation, BritDoc Films 2014) (streamed using Netflix)
(documentary website: dirtywars.org); see also Mark Karlin, In Scahill Documentary,
Blowback May Be Biggest, Most Dangerous Legacy of US Dirty Wars, TRUTHOUT (Jun.
25, 2013), [hereinafter Mark Karlin] http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/17190-in-
scahill-documentary-blowback-may-be-biggest-most-dangerous-legacy-of-us-dirty-wars.
313 See Mark Karlin, supra note 312 ("This is at the heart of Dirty Wars, that the life
of non-Americans (unless they are Americans targeted by the White House, then they too
can be given a death sentence) in dusty nations are considered less valuable, as Scahill
notes, than ours.").
314 See Colum Lynch, supra note 215.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id.
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that supported the states' own strategic and economic interests
above the lives of civilians that opposed regime change in Libya,
they acted with ethnocentrism, and as a result, lives were lost."'
Not only is ethnocentrism a problem from a sociological stand
point, it may actually be a violation of the principles underlying
the responsibility to protect. The non-intervention principle
"protects peoples and cultures, enabling societies to maintain the
religious, ethnic, and civilizational differences that they
cherish."319 The value placed on cultural diversity does not cease
to exist simply because the non-intervention principle has been
overcome. To the contrary, the ICISS has made a specific effort to
protect against ethnocentric practices in the context of
responsibility-to-protect intervention.3 2 0 In addition to pointing
out the cultural interests protected by non-intervention, the ICISS
lays out specific intervention principles designed to protect against
politicizing intervention and acting based on cultural biases. For
example, intervention action should be blind to the political nature
of the human rights violations and should focus solely on the
humanitarian effort of intervention; whether the atrocities
stemmed from government action or government failure should
not affect the action taken.3 21 Similarly, intervention action should
only be taken in the face of large-scale loss of life and not in
response to a military take over or regime change.32 2 Finally, the
ICISS explicitly demands that intervention protect "all members of
a population, regardless of ethnic origin or relation to the previous
source of power in the territory."323
In addition to violating the responsibility-to-protect principles,
ethnocentrism causes tension internationally and leads to a
reluctance to resort to responsibility-to-protect intervention in the
future. Acting on ethnocentric motivations can make what began
as a responsibility to protect-justified intervention, look like a
politically motivated attack on an unfavorable regime.324 The
ethnocentric actions taken by the Western states in Libya have led
318 See id.
319 ICISS Report, supra note 1, §§ 4.1-2.
320 Id.
321 Id. at § 4.22.
322 Id. at §§ 4.21-.25.
323 Id. at § 5.8.
324 See infra notes 341-348 and accompanying text.
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to an unwillingness to intervene in Syria, separate and apart from
the politically-motivated unwillingness to intervene on the part of
Russia and China.32 5 Such abuses blur the line between
intervention justified under the responsibility to protect, and uses
of force in violation of Article 2 of the U.N. Charter.3 26
B. Abuses of The Responsibility to Protect and Legal Line
Drawing
Humanitarian concerns are at times invoked to justify
inexcusable actions not warranted by the responsibility to
protect.3 27  While some instances of alleged responsibility to
protect abuse are not clear-cut, such as the suggested improper
application of the responsibility to protect in the intervention in
Libya, some abuses are unambiguous. When Russia invaded
Georgia in 2008, Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov,
justified the action under the responsibility to protect, responding
to what Russia saw as "genocide" in the republic of South
Ossetia.3 28 In August 2008, Georgia led a surprise night attack on
South Ossetia, employing roughly 11,000 Georgian troops, using
tanks, explosives, and banned weapons.3 29  Russia swiftly
responded, and claimed its invasion of Georgia was directed
325 E.g., Colum Lynch, supra note 215 ("The Russians, the Chinese, the South
Africans. . . the Brazilians, and the Indians have been much less supportive of the whole
outcome; they have seen it as sort of a violation of the principle of Responsibility to
Protect ... . [I]t seems evident to me, and the U.S. government I don't think accepts this,
that this went far beyond Responsibility to Protect. I think it's also a bit naive to think
that if you use military force in the name of Responsibility to Protect, that you can
somehow limit what a military does to the letter of the law. In the sense that you send
the military force in, and militaries are trained to achieve decisive military
objectives .. . [a]nd that meant going after military targets, going after hitting family
members, chasing down Qaddafi and trying to kill him himself. And so these are things
that go beyond what most people would've thought Responsibility to Protect entailed.").
326 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
327 See infra notes 341-348 and accompanying text.
328 Gareth Evans, Russia and the 'Responsibility to Protect', L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 31,
2008), http://www.latimes.com/la-oe-evans31-2008aug31,0,1295318.story#axzz2q I
jxUOlR.
329 Robert Bridge, Did Georgia Get a US Green Light to Attack South Ossetia?, RT
(Aug. 5, 2011, 6:17 PM), http://rt.com/politics/georgia-medvedev-ossetia-war-interview/;
Lira Tshkhovrebova, Georgia's Shameful Attack on South Ossetia, LA TIMES (Nov. 17,
2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oew-tskhovreboval7-2008novl7,0,225
1465.story#axzz2uCP2mtMw.
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primarily at protecting Russian citizens.33 This use of the
responsibility to protect to justify invasion has been challenged on
several grounds.3 ' First, critics doubt that the threat to the people
of South Ossetia was serious enough to meet the just cause
threshold to warrant military intervention.332 Even if the threat in
South Ossetia had reached the level of large scale loss of life or
ethnic cleansing required to meet the just cause threshold of
responsibility-to-protect military intervention, Russia's aim to
protect its own citizens living within the region is not an
acceptable motive under the responsibility to protect. Further,
critics question whether protection of Russia's citizens or
otherwise was Russia's primary motivation for the invasion.33 4
Other suspected motivations include a desire to take control of
Ossetia and Abkazia,33 s undermine Georgia's military, and derail
Georgia's NATO ambitions. 3 6  The likelihood that these ulterior
motives spurred the invasion is supported by the fact that Russia
did not exhaust peaceful means of protection prior to invading
Georgia, and responded to the alleged genocide in a way that has
been called "excessive," both strategically and geographically.
330 Gareth Evans, supra note 328.
331 E.g., Russia vs. Georgia: The Fallout, INT'L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO
PROTECT (Aug. 22, 2008), http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/
component/content/article/i 33-europe/i 829-intemational-crisis-grouprussia-vs-georgia-
the-fallout; Gareth Evans, supra note 328.
332 Global Centre for R2P's Background Note on Georgia and Russia, INT'L
COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect
.org/index.php/component/content/article/133-europe/i 815-global-centre-for-
Responsibility-to-Protects-background-note-on-georgia-and-russia (last visited Jan. 22,
2014); Gareth Evans, supra note 328.
333 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 4.27 ("[The ICISS] regard[s] that as being again a
matter appropriately covered under existing international law, and in particular Article 51
of the U.N.Charter."); Global Centre for R2P's Background Note on Georgia and
Russia, INT'L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibility
toprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/133-europe/1815-global-centre-for-
Responsibility-to-Protects-background-note-on-georgia-and-russia (last visited Jan. 22,
2014).
334 Gareth Evans, supra note 328.
335 Both Ossetia and Abkazia lie on the Georgian border of Russia. Georgia Profile,
BBC NEWS EUR., http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17301647 (see map within)
(last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
336 Gareth Evans, supra note 328.
337 Id. (noting that Russia sent "about 20,000 Russian troops and 100 tanks into
South Ossetia and ... Georgia"); see also Global Centre for R2P's Background Note on
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Not only do these facts make more likely the suspected
inappropriate motives, but both are violations of the precautionary
principles guiding military intervention under the responsibility to
protect.33 8  Perhaps most importantly, Russia acted without
approval from the U.N. Security Council, so it had no legal
authority for its actions.339
Another invasion not justified by the responsibility to protect,
in which the invading government advanced a humanitarian
agenda, was the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States.340
While the 1991 intervention in Iraq, Operation Desert Storm, took
place ten years before the ICISS was established and published its
report on the responsibility to protect, the intervention was
authorized by the U.N. Security Council, and is generally viewed
as a mission aimed at protecting Kuwait from Iraqi invasion.34 '
But even at that time, protecting Kuwait, an ally, was not the
United States' only interest; the United States also had an interest
in protecting "the flourishing oil trade."342 The 2003 invasion,
however, is clearly outside the bounds of the responsibility to
protect. First, the invasion was not motivated by humanitarian
concerns, but by the pursuit for weapons of mass destruction; it
was only after no such weapons were located that the United
States turned to humanitarian justifications for the invasion.343
Eleven years later, the United States still has troops in Iraq, and the
purpose of the occupation is unclear. Chuck Hagel, former United
States Senator, shed light on the confusion when discussing United
States' intervention:
One of the reasons we're in trouble in Afghanistan is because we
went well beyond our mission. We accomplished the mission
then we took our eye off the ball and intervened, invaded Iraq,
and occupied Iraq. And now, twelve years later, we're not sure
Georgia and Russia, supra note 332.
338 ICISS Report, supra note 1, at XII.
339 Global Centre for R2P's Background Note on Georgia and Russia, supra note
332.
340 Heinze, supra note at 3 10.
341 See Persian Gulf War, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/persian-gulf-war
(last visited August 24, 2014); Joseph William Davids, Would Intervention in Syria
Violate International Law, THE NEW INT'L LAW (Sept. 8, 2012), https://thenew
internationallaw.wordpress.com/tag/gulf-war/.
342 Great Decisions in Foreign Policy, supra note 170.
343 Heinze, supra note at 3 10.
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what our mission is. Is our mission to eliminate the
Taliban? That never was our mission. Is it nation building? Is
it sending children to school? Is it building sewer systems? Is it
going after al-Qaeda? 344
Notably, none of the suggested purposes would meet the "right
intention" principle in order to justify intervention under the
responsibility to protect.345 Second, the just cause threshold was
not met, as the atrocities in Iraq at the time did not reach a large-
scale loss of life.3 46  While Saddam Hussein's rule of Iraq was
violent and at times reached the large-scale loss of life necessary
to justify responsibility-to-protect intervention, responsibility-to-
protect action must be preventative, and cannot be justified by
looking to atrocities in the past. 347  Finally, like the Russian
invasion of Georgia in 2008, the United States' invasion of Iraq in
2003 was not authorized by the U.N. Security Council.34 8
In instances such as these, in which the action taken by one
state against another is not justified by the responsibility to protect,
the action is an unlawful use of force in violation of Article 2 of
the U.N. Charter.3 49 Nevertheless, in Russia's case, no sanctions
were issued, and at the time there was speculation that Germany
would not support sanctions against Russia for fear of endangering
its relationship with Russia, and specifically its access to gas and
oil. 35 o Further, in 2010, two years after the Georgia-Russia
debacle, NATO adopted a new strategic concept, in which it
committed to "reinforc[ing] cooperation with Russia."3 1
Likewise, the United States has not faced sanctions for its
unlawful use of force in Iraq, and in fact American combat troops
remained in Iraq for eight years.3 52
344 Chuck Hagel, supra note 224.
345 ICISS Report, supra note 1, § 4.32.
346 Id. §§ 4.10-.20.
347 Id.
348 See Heinze, supra note at 3 10.
349 Mark Tran, Julian Borger, & Ian Traynor, EU Threatens Sanctions Against
Russia, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008
/aug/28/eu.russia; see U.N. Charter art. 2.
350 Tran, Boger, & Traynor, supra note 349.
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352 See Anjulo Sastry & Alisa Wiersema, 10-year Iraq War Timeline, ABC NEWS
(March 19, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/TheNote/10-year-iraq-war-
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The failure to address unlawful breaches of state sovereignty
sends a message to both the violating states and international
observers: for powerful states, like Russia and the United States,
anything goes.
VI. Conclusion
The inconsistent application of responsibility-to-protect
principles in the thirteen years since its inception shows that
responsibility-to-protect intervention does not, in fact, turn on
humanitarian principles, but on some combination of power
dynamics, political strategy, and economic gain."'
In the past, the doctrine has been abused and misapplied.354
Unjustified attacks have been launched in violation of the U.N.
Charter; interventions justified by the responsibility to protect at
the outset have been executed in violation of the principles
underlying the doctrine; and situations warranting international
action have been ignored due to the economic and strategic
interests of states with the power to prevent intervention.5
If the abuses seen in the past decade continue, the
responsibility to protect doctrine is unlikely to survive. Not only
do these abuses of the responsibility to protect violate the
principles underlying the doctrine, they contribute to an
international atmosphere of mistrust and reluctance that in turn
obstructs responsibility-to-protect intervention in situations in
which action is warranted and sorely needed. The international
community has already seen and felt some of the lasting effects of
the 2011 intervention in Libya.356 Operation Unified Protector has
been a "divisive" issue, and the belief that the intervention violated
the principles of the responsibility to protect has caused tension in
the U.N. Security Council." One of the consequences of NATO's
overreaching in Libya is the hesitancy of the international
community to intervene in Syria.35 ' Even if the U.N. does not
officially disavow responsibility to protect, the international
community will turn its back on the doctrine and oppose
353 See supra Part V.
354 Id.
355 Id.
356 See Colum Lynch, supra note 215.
357 Id.
358 Id.
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intervention as it becomes clear that those who abuse a doctrine
designed to encourage responsibility ultimately will not be held
responsible.

